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THE REAL IMPACT OF ADOPTIVE COUPLE V. BABY GIRL:
THE EXISTING INDIAN FAMILY DOCTRINE IS NOT
AFFIRMED, BUT THE FUTURE OF THE ICWA'S
PLACEMENT PREFERENCES IS JEOPARDIZED
MARCIA A. ZUG

I.

INTRODUCTION

On July 3, 2013, Dusten Brown, his wife-Robin-and Brown's
parents-Tommy and Alice Brown-filed actions to adopt "Baby
Veronica,"' the four-year-old girl at the heart of the United States Supreme
Court's recent decision in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl.2 The Browns
based their adoption petitions on the Indian preference provisions of the
Indian Child Welfare Act 3 (ICWA or Act) and the assumption that the
Baby Girl Court did not affirm the existing Indian family (EIF) doctrine,4 a
doctrine that limits application of the ICWA solely to children previously
in the care or custody of an Indian relative.5 Because the Browns believed
the Court did not affirm the EIF doctrine, they believed the ICWA's
placement preferences, which give priority to Indian relatives in Indian

Copyright 0 2014, Marcia A. Zug.
. Associate Professor of Law, University of South Carolina School of Law. Professor
Zug earned her Juris Doctor at Yale Law School before clerking for the Honorable Dolores
Sloviter, former Chief Judge of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. Professor Zug writes
frequently on the intersection of Indian law and family law.
1 Andrew Knapp, Father Files to Adopt Veronica. Move Heats up Custody Dispute,
PosT & COURIER, July 9, 2013, at Al; see Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 746 S.E.2d 51,
51-52 (S.C. 2013); Michael Muskal, Girl, 4, Returned to Her Adoptive Parents, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 25, 2013, at Al2.
2 Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013).
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (2012).
4 This Article uses EIF doctrine when discussing this concept generally, but refers to the
EIF exception when specifically referring to the exception created by the doctrine.
5 See Cheyafdna L. Jaffke, The "ExistingIndian Family" Exception to the Indian Child
Welfare Act: The States'Attempt to Slaughter TribalInterests in Indian Children, 66 LA. L.
REV. 733, 741 (2006) ("The [EIF] exception is an entirely judge-made doctrine that bars
application of the ICWA when either the child or the child's parents have not maintained a
significant social, cultural, or political relationship with his tribe.").
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6

child adoption cases, continued to apply to their case and required
Veronica's placement with an Indian relative. A close reading of the Baby
Girl opinion supports the Browns' position. Nevertheless, on July 17,
2013, the South Carolina Supreme Court issued a remand to the South
Carolina Family Court to finalize Veronica's non-Indian adoption.
According to the South Carolina Supreme Court, the ICWA placement
preferences were inapplicable because neither Brown nor his parents filed
adoption petitions at the time of the original hearing.9
The South Carolina Supreme Court's ruling misinterprets the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision on the applicability of the ICWA's placement
preferences to Veronica's adoption. Unfortunately, the South Carolina
Supreme Court's decision will likely be the first of many decisions in
which judges interpret Baby Girl to limit the applicability of the ICWA's
placement preferences. This Article examines the Court's decision in Baby
Girl and concludes that it did not affirm the EIF doctrine, but that it did
significantly curtail the applicability of the placement preferences in many
future ICWA cases.
Part II of this Article discusses the EIF doctrine and shows how courts
have found that the EIF doctrine prevents the application of all ICWA
provisions, including the placement preferences of § 1915(a), to Indian
children not deemed part of an "existing Indian family."10 Part III analyzes
the Supreme Court's decision in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl and argues
that this ruling was limited to ICWA § 1912(d) and (f) and, thus, was not a
confirmation of the EIF doctrine."
Part IV examines the Baby Girl
Court's discussion of § 1915(a) and why the South Carolina Supreme
Court was wrong to find the ICWA's placement provisions did not apply.12
Finally, Part V shows how the U.S. Supreme Court's decision, which
limited § 1915(a) to parties that have formally filed for custody, will
6 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) ("In any adoptive placement of an Indian child under [s]tate law,
a preference shall be given. . . to a placement with (1) a member of the child's extended
family; (2) other members of the Indian child's tribe; or (3) other Indian families.").
7 See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 746 S.E.2d 51, 52 (S.C. 2013) (noting Birth
Father's argument that the ICWA placement preferences precluded Adoptive Couple from
adopting Baby Veronica).
Id. at 54.
9 Id. at 52-53 (quoting Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2557, 2564
(2013)).
'0 See infra Part II.
"See infra Part III.

12 See infra Part IV.
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dramatically reduce this provision's applicability and importance in future
ICWA cases.13

II. THE EXISTING INDIAN FAMLY DocTRINE
Long before the Baby Veronica story became national news, courts
routinely grappled with the question of whether the ICWA applied to
Indian children who had never been part of an Indian family. 14 Many
judges were uneasy with the idea of applying the ICWA to children who
met the Act's definition of an "Indian child," but had little or no contact
with their Indian relatives.' 5 In 1982, this uneasiness led the Kansas
Supreme Court to create the EIF exception in In re Adoption of Baby
Boy L.
A. Baby Boy L. and Its Aftermath
In Baby Boy L., the Kansas Supreme Court was asked to decide
whether the ICWA applied to the adoption of an Indian child who had
never been in the care or custody of his Indian father.' 6 The child's father
was an enrolled member of the Kiowa tribe and, pursuant to § 1911 of the
ICWA, the tribe sought to intervene, to transfer the case to tribal court, and
to change temporary custody.' 7 The trial court denied these motions" and
the Kansas Supreme Court affirmed.' 9 Although the ICWA gives tribes
the right to "intervene at any point" in a "state court proceeding for the
foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to an Indian
child,"20 the Baby Boy L. court found the Act did not apply because the
child had never been in the care or custody of his Indian father or any other
Indian relatives. The court then used this fact as the basis for creating the

'3

See infra Part V.

In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982) (holding the ICWA
does not apply to a proceeding that involves a non-Indian mother's illegitimate child who
was never in the custody and care of the father); see also In re Adoption of Baby Boy D,
742 P.2d 1059 (Okla. 1985) (holding that father did not have standing under the ICWA),
overruledby In re A.J.S., 204 P.3d 543 (Kan. 2009).
1s See infra notes 18-40 and accompanying text.
1 See Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d at 171-72.
7
Id. at 173.
1s Id.
Id. at 176.
20 Id. at 176-77 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c) (2012)).
14 See
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EIF exception21and concluded that, in such cases, "[t]he issue of the
preservation of the Indian family [was] not involved" and the ICWA was
inapplicable.2 2
After Baby Boy L., other courts also began applying the EIF exception.
In 1985, the Oklahoma Supreme Court applied the EIF doctrine in In re
Adoption of Baby Boy D23 to find that § 1914 of the ICWA, which allows
"4any

parent . . . from

whose

custody

such

[Indian]

child

was

removed .. . [to] petition any court of competent jurisdiction to invalidate
such action upon a showing that such action violated any provision of
sections 1911, 1912 and 1911 ,"24 did not give an unwed Indian father
standing to challenge the adoption of his son.25 According to the Baby Boy
D court, § 1914 "grants standing to invalidate an action only to the parent
from whose custody such child was removed." 2 6 Therefore, because the
court concluded that the father "never had custody" of the child, it ruled
that the father did not have standing to challenge the adoption.27 The court
further added that its interpretation was consistent with the purpose of the
ICWA, stating that Congress enacted the ICWA solely to prevent the
removal of an "Indian child from an existing Indian family unit." 2 8
29
One year later, in In re S.A.M, the Missouri Court of Appeals held
that the EIF doctrine prevented an Indian father from challenging the
involuntary termination of his rights under § 1912(d) and (f) of the
ICWA.30 Section 1912(d) requires that the state make "active efforts ... to
prevent the break up of the Indian family,"3 1 and § 1912(f) requires, as a
condition precedent to the termination of parental rights, "that the
continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to

See id. at 175 ( "[The ICWA] was not to dictate that an illegitmate infant who has
never been a member of an Indian home or culture, and probably never would be, should be
removed from its primary cultural heritage and placed in an Indian enviroment over the
express objections of its non-Indian mother.").
22 Id. at 174-75 (internal quotation marks omitted) (upholding the trial court's findings).
23 742 P.2d 1059 (Okla. 1985).
21

24

Id. at 1064 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1914).

Id.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
27 Id. at 1067.
25
26

Id. at 1064.
703 S.W.2d 603 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
3o Id. at 608-09 (citing In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168, 175 (Kan.
1982)).
31 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (2012).
2
29
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result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child." 32 In S.A.M.,
the court found that these sections did not apply because the father had no
previous relationship with the child and there was no "Indian family" to
In addition, the court quoted the Baby Boy L. decision
preserve.
extensively, 34 agreeing with the Kansas Supreme Court that the sole
purpose of the ICWA is to prevent "the removal of Indian children from an
existing Indian family unit and the resultant breakup of the Indian
family."3 5
The cases discussed above demonstrate the appeal and versatility of
the EIF exception. In the first five years after it was created, many state
courts used the ElF exception to avoid application of multiple ICWA
provisions, including §§ 1911(a) and (b), 1912(d) and (f), and 1914.6
Since then, courts have also used the EIF doctrine to avoid other ICWA
provisions, most notably § 1915(a), which gives preference to Indian
placements over non-Indian ones.3 7
In In re Santos y,38 a California court used the EIF doctrine to avoid
applying § 1915(a).39 Santos Y. involved an Indian mother, an enrolled
member of the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, whose child tested positive for
cocaine and was, thus, removed shortly after birth by the local department
of family. 40 Due to the ICWA placement preferences, the trial court
ordered the child to be placed with the mother's Chippewa family on the
Chippewa reservation.4 1 However, on appeal, the California Court of
Appeals reversed, finding that the birth mother was not involved with the
tribe and, thus, "[t]here [was] no Indian family . .. to preserve."42
32

Id. § 1912(f).
SAM, 703 S.W.2d at 608.
34 See id. at 608.
35
Id. at 608-09; In re Adoption of T.R.M., 525 N.E.2d 298, 302-03 (Ind. 1988).
36 Crystal R. v. Superior Court, 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 414, 427 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)
(remanding to lower court to determine whether the ICWA applies to the biological parents'
termination proceeding under § 1914); Claymore v. Serr, 405 N.W.2d 650, 654 (N.D.
1987) (holding that § 1911(a)-(b) did not apply because the child was not removed from an
existing Indian family); In re Adpotion of D.M.J., 741 P.2d 1386, 1388-89 (Okla. 1985)
(refusing to apply § 1912 because the child was not removed from an Indian family).
1 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
38 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
3

39
40

Id. at 726.
Id. at 697-98.

41 Id.
42

at 699.

Id. at 726.
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B. Expansion of the EIFDoctrine

By the time Santos Y. was decided, the breadth of the EIF doctrine had
grown dramatically. In the years since the Kansas court decided Baby Boy
L., courts applied the EIF doctrine to mothers,43 fathers," tribes,45 children
with high and low blood quantums," and, most importantly, to multiple
sections of the Act.47 In addition, as Santos Y. demonstrates, the EIF
doctrine soon eclipsed its original definition. Courts, such as the court in
Santos Y., no longer limited the EIF doctrine to cases in which an Indian
child lacked a relationship with its Indian family. Instead, these courts
began using the EIF doctrine even in cases in which the child had been in
the custody of its Indian parent, if the court believed the parent was not
quite Indian enough.48
Specifically, in Santos Y, the California Court of Appeals found there
was no existing Indian family because, despite the fact the mother was an
enrolled member of the Chippewa tribe, the court believed she was not
sufficiently involved with her tribe.4 9 Similarly, in In re Adoption ofBaby
Boy C, 50 a New York family court found the Indian child's tribe had no
right to intervene in the child's adoption proceedings because, although the
mother was also an enrolled tribal member, she was currently inactive.
43

id

In re Adoption of Baby Boy D, 742 P.2d 1059, 1063-64 (Okla. 1985).
See infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
46 See Santos Y., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 697 (describing that each biological parent had
Native American heritage); In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507, 515 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)
(noting that the children were of American Indian descent).
47 See Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 516 (holding that the ICWA does not apply when
the parents do not maintain a strong relationship with their tribe).
48 See, e.g., In re M.B., 176 P.3d 977, 985 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008) ("The existing Indian
family doctrine, as recognized by many courts, precludes application of the ICWA when the
Indian child's parent or parents have not maintained a significant social, cultural, or
political relationship with an Indian tribe."); Rye v. Weasel, 934 S.W.2d 257, 263 (Ky.
1996) (holding that the EIF doctrine applied because the foster family did not adopt the
Indian culture).
49 See Santos Y.,
112 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 723-24 (stating that the ICWA was
unconstituionally applied because the mother did not have significant involvement with her
tribe).
o 784 N.Y.S.2d 334 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2004), rev'd, 805 N.Y.S.2d 313 (N.Y. App. Div.
2005).
51 See Baby Boy C., 805 N.Y.S.2d at 317 (noting the family court's findings before
reversing that decision).
4

45
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Additionally, the family court stated that, when an Indian parent has
insufficient ties to the tribe, requiring the tribe to "relinquish[] control over
a child born to [such] parents . . . costs the tribe nothing., 5 2

A third example of these "not Indian enough" cases is In re Bridget
R.s 3 In Bridget R., both parents were Indian; the father was an enrolled
member of the Dry Creek Rancheria of Pomo Indians and possessed
custodial rights of the child. 54 At the time the mother became pregnant,
she and the father were living together and jointly raising their two sons,55
but, soon after discovering the pregnancy, the parents' financial situation
deteriorated and they had to move into a shelter. 56 Due to these
difficulties, the parents placed their twins for adoption. 7 However, the
father's voluntary relinquishment of his parental rights violated the
ICWA5 8 and, shortly afterward, he and his tribe sought to invalidate the
adoption. 9
The father had a strong case: He was an enrolled member of a federally
recognized Indian tribe and clearly possessed custodial rights to his
children at the time of the relinquishment.60 Nevertheless, the Bridget R.
court still found the ICWA inapplicable. 6 1 The California Court of Appeal
appeared to want to base its decision on domicile, noting that it had
"doubt[s] as to whether [the father], who, at all relevant times, resided
several hundred miles from the tribal reservation, ever participated in tribal
life or maintained any significant social, cultural[,] or political relationship

Baby Boy C., 784 N.Y.S.2d at 341.
49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
54

Id. at 515.

" Id. at 517.
56 id
57

id.

58 Id. at 515. "ICWA requires, among other things, that any voluntary termination of
parental rights respecting an Indian child be (1) executed in writing, (2) recorded before a
judge, and (3) executed more than ten days after the birth of the child." Id. (citing 25
U.S.C. § 1913(a) (2012)). "Any consent not meeting these requirements is invalid and may
be declared so at any time by a court of competent jurisdiction upon petition by the child,
the Indian parent or custodian, or the child's tribe." Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1914).
s9 See id. at 518 (stating that the father wanted to rescind the relinquishment of his
parental rights due to his mother's desire to have his sister raise the twins).
60
Id. at 516-17.
6

Id. at 514-15.
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with the [t]ribe." 6 2 However, after the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Mississippi Band of Choctaw v. Holyfield,63 the California
Court of Appeal could not base its decision solely on the family's distance
from the reservation. 4 Consequently, the court was forced to offer a
different definition of "a significant social, cultural[,] or political
relationship" sufficient to characterize a person as Indian and, thus, as a
person capable of creating an Indian family.65
The new definition of an Indian family offered by the Bridget R. court
turned on whether the Indian parents:
[P]rivately observed tribal customs and, among other
things, whether, despite their distance from the
reservation, they participated in tribal community affairs,
voted in tribal elections, or otherwise took an interest in
tribal politics, contributed to tribal or Indian charities,
subscribed to tribal newsletters or other periodicals of
special interest to Indians, participated in Indian religious,
social, cultural[,] or political events [that] are held in their
own locality, or maintained social contracts with other
members of [t]ribe.

62 Id. at 515-16. At the time of the relinquishment, the biological father (Richard) was
living with the biological mother (Cindy) and their two children. Id. at 517. Together they
made the decision to relinquish their parental rights because they realized they would not
financially be able to care for the children. Id. Although the relationship between Richard
and Cindy eventually deteriorated, they were together during her entire pregnancy and he
was entitled to shared legal custody at the time of the twins' birth. Id. at 518.
6' 490 U.S. 30, 48-49 (1989) (holding that the children were domiciled on the
reservation even though they had never been to the reservation).
6 Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 522 (holding that a child's birth or residence off
reservation did not by itself make the ICWA inapplicable).
65 See id. at 516.
66 Id. at 531. One professor posited:

To anyone who has had significant contact with tribal communities,
this list of required affiliating acts says far more about the
organizational experience of the justices than the realities of tribal life.
Newsletter subscriptions and charitable contributions may be the
mainstays of membership in the ACLU, the Christian Coalition, or the
Sierra Club. But to insist that Indian people demonstrate their
affiliation with their tribes in the same way is to impose non-Indian
understandings of Indianness and of organizational belonging onto the
(continued)
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The court then applied these criteria to the parents in Bridget R. and
concluded that the Indian father was not Indian enough.67 According to the
court, the father had "fully assimilated into non-Indian culture" and,
therefore, his family did not qualify as Indian.68 The court then refused to
apply the ICWA, finding that "'the unique values of Indian culture'
[would] not be preserved in the home[]."
C. Redefining the Indian Child
Cases like Bridget R. redefined the EIF exception to mean that the
child's Indian parents must "prove that they themselves have a significant
relationship with an Indian community," and these cases left the
determination of whether an Indian parent was sufficiently Indian up to the
non-Indian courts. 70 Consequently, decisions like Bridget R. were a
substantial blow to Indian families, but they were still not the most extreme
expansion of the EIF doctrine. Some courts extended the EIF doctrine
even further, finding that the determinative factor is whether the Indian
child has a connection to the Indian tribe independent of its relationship to
its parents' connection to the tribe.7
For example, in In re Adoption ofD.MJ., 72 a non-Indian mother placed
her child for adoption six years after her divorce from the child's Indian
father.7 3 Although the father was a full-blooded member of the Cherokee
tribe 74 and previously exercised custody, including a period of primary
custody over the child,75 the Supreme Court of Oklahoma still applied the

realities of tribal members. For most tribal cultures, what binds them
together is far more profound and spiritual than any newsletter.
Carole Goldberg, Descent into Race, 49 UCLA L. REv. 1373, 1388 (2002).
67 See Bridget R., 41 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 536-37.
6
1Id. at 526.
69 Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1902
(2012)).
7Od.
at 531.
n1 See Christine Metteer Lorillard, Retelling the Stories of Indian Families: Judicial
Narratives that Determine the Placement of Indian Children Under the Indian Child
Welfare Act, 8 WHIIER J. CHILD & FAM. Anvoc. 191, 214-17 (2008) (noting the changed
definition came after the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Holyfield).
72 741 P.2d 1386 (Okla. 1985).
7
1Id. at 1387.
74 Id.
7 Id. at 1390 (Hodges, J., dissenting) ("The record reflects that D. lived for a period of
time with her natural father and her paternal, Indian grandparents after the divorce.").
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The court held that
EIF exception and found the ICWA inapplicable.
involuntary termination of the father's rights was permissible because it
concluded that the fact the child had been in the custody of her non-Indian
mother for six years meant she was not being removed from the custody of
an Indian parent or environment.
Similarly, in State ex rel. D.A. C,78 a Utah family court terminated a
divorced Indian father's parental rights so that the mother's new husband
could adopt the children. 7 9 Although the children's father had previously
exercised custody and he and the children were all enrolled members of the
Eastern Shoshone Tribe, the trial court found there was no "existing Indian
family" because the children had been in the physical custody of the
mother since the divorce and, thus, were not being removed from an
existing Indian cultural setting.o
The above cases clearly break with the original EIF cases and the
understanding that the exception should be limited to parents who had not
previously exercised custody. However, even these cases were not the
most expansive application of the exception. In the shocking case of Rye
v. Weasel,8' the court applied the exception to an Indian child raised by
Indian parents on an Indian reservation.82 Rye involved a custody
proceeding between a divorcing foster couple who had cared for an Indian
child. The child was born on reservation, was an enrolled member of the
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, and was a ward of the Standing Rock Sioux
Tribal Court. 4 Nevertheless, relying on the ELF doctrine, the Kentucky
Supreme Court denied the tribe's motion to intervene in the custody
proceedings and its request to transfer the case to tribal court.
Specifically, the Rye court found that it was unimportant that the child
had previously lived in Indian country, in an Indian cultural environment,
or with an Indian parent because it concluded that she was no longer living
7

7
7

Id. at 1389 (majority opinion).
Id.
933 P.2d 993 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).

Id. at 995, 1003. The Utah Court of Apeals ultimately affirmed the termination of the
father's parental rights. Id. at 1003.
80 Id. at 995, 998. The appellate court overruled the trial court's determination that the
ICWA did not apply. Id. at 1000.
8934
S.W.2d 257 (Ky. 1996).
82 Id. at 257-59.
8
Id. at 257-58.
8 Id. at 259.
7

" Id. at 259, 264.
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in such an Indian environment.86 The court also found it insufficient that
the child was a ward of the tribe and had previously lived on the
reservation with her Indian mother, whose rights were never terminated.
Lastly, the court ignored the fact that the child's foster father, an enrolled
member of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, moved back to the reservation
after the divorce and, thus, would have cared for her on the reservation if
granted custody. 8 The court dismissed all these facts and found the ICWA
inapplicable based on its conclusion that the child had primarily grown up
in a non-Indian environment,'89 did not speak the Sioux language, 90 and did
not practice its religion or customs. 91
D. Criticism of the EIFDoctrine
As the above cases demonstrate, courts have used the EIF doctrine in a
wide range of Indian child cases and in some instances quite expansively.
However, this expansion led many to question the correctness of the
doctrine and, over time, opponents of the EIF doctrine have used this
uneasiness to successfully convince nineteen states that the exception is an
unjustified loophole, violating both the language and the spirit of the
ICWA.92 Consequently, the majority of states that have considered the EIF
Id. at 262 (discussing the failure to pass amendments to the ICWA that would
have
made it mandatory to apply the ICWA to situations in which the child lived in an Indian
country or environment).
81 Id. at 259,
263.
88
Id. at 259.
89 See id. at 264.
90Id. at 260. Even this is somewhat disingenuous because, as the court noted, "[s]he
[knew] some words and phrases of the native Sioux language, but [could not] speak
conversationally in it." Id.
86

91 Id.
92 See Annette Ruth Appell, 5 NEV. L.J. 141, 162-67 (2004) (discussing problems with
the EIF doctrine and the courts that have employed it); Dan Lewerenz & Padraic McCoy,
The End of "Existing Indian Family" Jurisprudence: Holyfield at 20, In the Matter of
A.J.S., and the Last Gasps ofa Dying Doctrine,36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 684,687 (2010)
(discussing that nineteen states have rejected the ElF doctrine); Jaffke, supra note 5, at 741
("The [EIF] exception is an entirely judge-made doctrine that bars application of the ICWA
when either the child or the child's parents have not maintained a significant social,
cultural, or political relationship with his tribe."); see generally Suzianne D. PainterThorne, One Step Forward, Two Giant Steps Back: How the "Existing Indian Family"
Exception (Re)Imposes Anglo American Legal Values on American Indian Tribes to the
Detriment of Cultural Autonomy, 33 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 329 (2009) (discussing how courts
have used the EIF doctrine).
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doctrine have now rejected it, including four states-Kansas, South
Dakota, Oklahoma, and Washington-that had previously applied the EIF
doctrine.93
Of the nineteen states that have rejected the doctrine, the most
significant is Kansas-the state that first created it. Specifically, in In re
A.J.S., 94 the Kansas Supreme Court overruled Baby Boy L. 95 and rejected
the EIF doctrine, concluding that the doctrine ignores the tribal interests
that "drove passage of [the] ICWA" and deviates from the Act's "core
purpose of 'preserving and protecting the interests of Indian tribes in their
children.'" 96 The court further held that the doctrine was unnecessary
because the ICWA provision allowing deviation for "'good
cause' . . . ensures that all interests-those of both natural parents, the
tribe, the child, and the prospective adoptive parents-are appropriately
considered and safeguarded."97
The sentiments of the A.JS. court reflect the view of the majority of
states that have considered the EIF doctrine. Nevertheless, a handful of
states still employ it98 and, consequently, when the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Baby Girl, there was a real question as to whether the Court
had done so to resolve this split regarding the validity of the EIF doctrine.99
However, the Court's opinion makes clear that Baby Girl is not an
affirmation of the ELF doctrine.
III. BABY GIRL DOES NOT AFFIRM THE EIF DOCTRINE
At first glance, plenty of reason exists to question whether Baby Girl is
an affirmation of the EIF doctrine. In many ways, the Court's discussion

Lewerenz & McCoy, supra note 92, at 687.
204 P.3d 543 (Kan. 2009).
9
Id. at 55 1.
96 Id. at 549-50 (quoting In re Baby Boy C., 805 N.Y.S.2d 313, 323 (N.Y. App. Div.
2005)).
9 Id. at 551; see Baby Boy C., 805 N.Y.S.2d at 322-23 ("Having considered the various
arguments and authorities for and against the acceptance of the EIF exception, we reject it
as fundamentally inconsistent with both the plain language of [the] ICWA and one of its
core purpose[s] of preserving and protecting the interests of Indian tribes in their children."
(footnote omitted)).
98 See Lewerenz & McCoy, supra note 92, at 687 (stating that only six states employ
the EIF doctrine).
9 See Adam Liptak, Justices Take Case on Adoption ofIndian Child,N.Y. TIMEs, Jan.
5, 2013, at All.
9

94
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of § 1912(d)'o and (f)'or mirrors that of early EIF cases. Like these cases,
the Court's decision focuses on the Indian father's lack of prior custody.o2
However, although the Court's discussion is similar to some of these
custody-based EIF cases, the Court's analysis of the applicability of
§ 1915(a) confirms that Baby Girl's prior relationship requirement is
limited to § 1912(d) and (f). Baby Girl is, thus, narrower than even the
most limited custody-based EIF cases that, unlike Baby Girl, did not
confine the EIF doctrine to a particular ICWA provision.
From the beginning, courts used the EIF doctrine to invalidate multiple
ICWA provisions based on an Indian parent's lack of prior custody. 0 3 In
contrast, the Baby Girl Court confined its prior custody reasoning to
§ 1912(d) and (f),'0 despite having the opportunity to apply this reasoning
to § 1915(a) as well. Instead, the Court explicitly noted that its decision
about § 1912 and prior custody had no impact on the applicability of
§ 1915(a).'0 o This refusal to extend the prior custody reasoning to
§ 1915(a) is significant and demonstrates that Baby Girl did not affirm the
existing Indian family doctrine. Moreover, the Court's opinion entirely
avoids any reliance on the issue of "Indianness,'0o which is also telling
because more recent EIF cases frequently find Indianness to be the
determinative issue.
A. The Baby Girl Holding
The issue in Baby Girl was whether the South Carolina Family Court
could involuntarily terminate the parental rights of an Indian father who
had no relationship, custodial or financial, with his child prior to the child's
ooCompare Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2561-63 (2013) (stating
that, when a parent abandons a child before birth, there is no relationship that is
discontinued), with In re S.A.M., 703 S.W.2d 603, 608 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (describing
that the minimal contacts between the child and parent were insufficient for § 1912(d) to
apply).
101CompareBaby Girl, 133 S. Ct. at 2560 (discussing that § 1912(f) is conditioned on
the continued custody of the child by the parent), with S.A.M, 703 S.W.2d at 607
(describing that § 1912(f) did not apply because the parent never had custody of the child).
102Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. at 2560 ("As a result, § 1912(f) does not apply in cases where
the Indian parent never had custody of the Indian child.").
103See supra text accompanying notes 16-31.
'0See Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. at 2557.
05
d.
106See id. at 2565 (stating that, in certain situations, many people would be hesitant to
adopt a child who might qualify as an Indian under the ICWA).
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adoptive placement.10 7 Under South Carolina law, a parent's failure to
provide financial support for a child constitutes grounds for involuntary
termination of that parent's parental rights.108 However, ICWA § 1912(d)
and (f) prevents such terminations. Section 1912(d) forbids this type of
termination unless "active efforts have been made to provide remedial
services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the
Indian family and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful,"l 09 and
§ 1912(f) forbids such terminations in the "absence of a determination,
supported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, including testimony of
qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custody of the child by the
parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or
physical damage to the child."o
When applicable, these ICWA subsections supersede state law and
prevent the termination of an Indian parent's rights." In Baby Girl, the
South Carolina Family Court found both subsections applicable and held
that the court could not involuntarily terminate Dusten Brown's parental
rights. 112 The court also added that, regardless of § 1912, the placement
preferences of § 1915(a) barred the adoption because these preferences
require courts to place Indian children with an Indian relative, tribal
member, or other Indian family before considering non-Indian
placements.' 13
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed all three
determinations." 4
With regard to § 1912(d) and (f), the Court held that these provisions
do not apply when the involuntary termination action is against a parent
who never exercised custodial rights.' 15 In reaching this conclusion, the
Court focused on the term continued custody and reasoned that it refers to
10 7

Id. at 2559.

S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-7-2570(4) (2010). Cf id. § 63-9-310 (2010) (establishing that,
if the father supported the mother during pregnancy, the father must consent to the
adoption).
09 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (2012).
"0Id. § 1912(f).
1"Andrea V. W. Van, The Indian Child Welfare Act and liiupiat Customs: A Case
Study of Conflicting Values, with Suggestions for Change, 21 ALASKA L. REv. 43, 48
(2004).
112 Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d 550, 556 (S.C. 2012), rev'd,
133 S. Ct.
2552 (2013).
113 See id. at 567 (affirming the lower court's interpretation
of§ 1915).
1 14
See Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. at 2565.
108

"s See id. at 2561-62.
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a "pre-existing state."ll 6 Therefore, the Court concluded "§ 1912(f) does
not apply in cases where the Indian parent never had custody of the Indian
child.""' The Court also found that § 1912(d) was similarly inapplicable
because Dusten Brown never had legal or physical custody of Veronica."'
According to the Court, Congress enacted the requirement in § 1912(d)that there be remedial services before terminating parental rights-to
prevent the "breakup of the Indian family" and, thus, the requirement only
applies when the parent has an established relationship with the child." 9
Further, the Court added that these statutory readings comport with the
purpose of the ICWA, which Congress enacted to "stem the unwarranted
removal of Indian children from intact Indian families." 2 0 The Court
explained that, in a case such as Baby Girl, where the non-Indian parent
with sole custodial rights initiated the adoption, "the ICWA's primary goal
of preventing the unwarranted removal of Indian children and the
dissolution of Indian families is not implicated."'21
B. Baby Girl andIndianness
In Baby Girl, the Court uses the term preexisting state to define the
term continued custody,12 2 but it is significant that the Court never
mentions the phrase existing Indianfamily. The Court's decision not to
employ this term makes sense because, upon close examination, it is clear
that the majority's definition of continued custody is different from what
lower courts have meant when defining an existing Indian family.
As Part II of this Article demonstrated,12 3 courts applying the EIF
doctrine have permitted the involuntary termination of parental rights even
in cases in which the Indian parent had exercised custody, as long as the
courts determined those parents had not been living an Indian lifestyle. 2 4
"' Id. at 2560.
117 Id.
" See id. at 2562.

"' Id.; 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (2012).
Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. at 2561.
id.

120
121
122

Id. at 2560.

See supra Part II.A-B.
Courts typically define this as "maintain[ing] a significant social, cultural[,] or
political relationship with their tribe." In re Bridget R., 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 507, 516 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1996). At the time of the relinquishment, Richard was living with Cindy and their two
children. Id. at 517. Together they made the decision to relinquish their parental rights
because they realized they would not be able to care financially for the children. Id.
(continued)
123

124

342
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In Baby Girl, the Court found there was no Indian family because the
father had no legal or physical relationship with his daughter, but not
because he was not Indian enough.125 The only hint of this idea is Justice
Alito's dual reference to the fact that Veronica is "1.2% (3/256)
Cherokee." 26 Although Alito had concerns with characterizing children
like Veronica as Indian because "an ancestor-even a remote one-was an
Indian," 27 such statements were irrelevant to the Court's decision. The
Court's opinion never questions whether Veronica is an "Indian child"
under the Act,128 and the opinion makes clear that, had Dusten Brown
exercised custody at some point prior to termination, he and Veronica
would have constituted an Indian family and § 1912 would have protected
their relationship. 12 9
In addition, even if one ignored the EIF cases based on Indianness and
looked solely at EIF cases concerning the existence of a prior custodial
relationship, the Court's decision still cannot be read as an affirmation of
the EIF doctrine. Although courts crafted the earliest ElF cases for
situations such as Baby Girl, where the objecting parent had never
exercised custodial rights,13 0 these decisions stand for the proposition that
the lack of a prior custodial relationship makes all of the ICWA's
provisions inapplicable.13' However, the Baby Girl majority specifically
noted that, subsequent to its decision, "'numerous' ICWA provisions"
would still apply and afford "'meaningful' protections to biological fathers

Although the relationship between Richard and Cindy eventually deteriorated, they were
together during her entire pregnancy and Richard was entitled to shared legal custody at the
time of the twins' birth. Id. at 516-17.
125 Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. at 2562.
126 Id. at 2556.
27
1 Id. at 2565.
128 Id. at 2557 n.l ("It is undisputed that Baby Girl is an 'Indian child' as defined by the
ICWA.. . ."). Similarly, although the justices had some question as to whether Brown was
a parent under the ICWA, they did not address this question. Id. at 2560 n.4. Moreover, in
the adoptive couple's brief, the couple also raised this issue to focus on the father's legal
relationship with the child, arguing that "parent" should not be "based on proven biology
alone." Brief for Petitioners at 23, Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (No. 12-399), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme courtpreview/briefsv2/12-399_pet.pdf.
129 See Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. at
2562.
130 See supraPart
II.A.
131 See supra Part
II.A.
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regardless of whether they ever had custody., 13 2 Specifically, the majority
approvingly cited the dissent's statements that the Baby Girl decision has
no impact on ICWA §§ 1911(b), 1913(a) and (c), and 1912(a) and (b), and
the majority also agreed that these sections will continue to apply to
noncustodial fathers. 33
In addition, Justice Breyer's concurrence further demonstrates that the
Baby Girl decision is too narrow to be an affirmation of the EIF doctrine.
In his concurrence, Justice Breyer notes that he joins the majority's
decision to bar application of § 1912(d) and (f) to Indian parents lacking a
prior custodial relationship,134 but he also takes pains to make his
agreement as limited as possible. He qualifies his agreement with a
number of significant exceptions that further limit the Court's decision and
show it is not an application of the EIF doctrine.3 3 For example, Justice
Breyer notes that the Court's holding should not and does not cover "a
father with visitation rights or a father who has paid all of his child support
obligations." 3 Justice Breyer further adds that the Baby Girl holding does
not cover "a father who was deceived about the existence of the child or a
father who was prevented from supporting his child.' 37 All of these
qualifications distinguish the court's holding from the EIF doctrine, which
has never contained these exceptions. In fact, many of these exceptions are
specifically at odds with the purpose behind the EIF doctrine.
1. Child Support
Justice Breyer would make an exception for a father who has paid all
his child support.'3 8 However, payment of child support creates a financial
relationship with the child, but not necessarily a custodial relationship. 3 9
Child support and child custody are not related, and payment of child

Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. at 2561 n.6 (quoting id. at 2574 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)).
id. (explaining that the dissent admitted that multiple ICWA sections provide
protections to biological fathers, regardless of whether the father previously had custody).
134 Id. at 2571 (Breyer, J., concurring).
135 See id. Consequently, without Justice Breyer's support, there is no majority opinion
for these circumstances. Id. at 2556 (majority opinion) (stating that Justice Breyer was the
fifth member of the majority).
136 Id. at 2571 (Breyer, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).
132

133 See

137 id.

id
See id. at 2578 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (discussing the example of a father who
did not have custody but still paid child support).
138
13
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support does not guarantee custodial or visitation rights.14 0 Moreover,
because parents frequently pay child support through wage garnishment, 14 1
one cannot even assume that a father who has paid all of his child support
has done so willingly. Consequently, a father who has no rights to his
child, but simply pays child support, would not meet the EIF definition of
having an existing family relationship with his child. However, according
to Justice Breyer, the Baby Girl decision does not exclude such a father.142
A father who has paid all his child support is still covered by § 1912(d) and
(f), regardless of any custodial relationship.143
2. ConcealedPregnancy
Justice Breyer also makes an exception for situations where a mother
concealed her pregnancy from an Indian father.'" This exception is
particularly revealing because, although there are no published cases in
which the court applied the EIF doctrine to an Indian parent who had paid
all child support owed, there are cases involving the concealment of
pregnancies.14 5 Thus, the fact that Justice Breyer makes an exception for
these situations, when the ELF doctrine does not, further indicates that the
Baby Girl decision is not an affirmation of the doctrine.14 6
First, for example, in Guardianshipof Zachary H., 4 7 the California
Court of Appeal used the reasoning of the EIF doctrine to terminate the
rights of a father who fully intended to support his child, but was prevented
140 See

id
See Mary Fenlon, Comment, Garnishment of Wages to Enforce Child Support: A
New Remedy for an Old Problem, 15 ST. MARY'S L.J. 381, 391 (1984); Debrina
Washington, Wage Garnishmentsand Child Support Payments: How Wage Garnishments
Are Processed, ABOUT.COM, http://singleparents.about.com/od/calculatepayments/a/wage..
garnishments.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2014) ("Child support payments are often facilitated
by the courts and a governmental agency through wage garnishments.").
142 See Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. at 2571 (Breyer, J., concurring).
143 Id. at 2578-79 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (discussing the example of a father who
did not have custody but still paid child support).
'" Id. at 2571 (Breyer, J., concurring).
145 Id. at 2578 n.8 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing A Child's Hope, LLC v. Doe, 630
S.E.2d 673, 674 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (explaining that the trial court found that the father
did not know of the child's birth until he was served a summons); In re Termination of
Parental Rights of Biological Parents of Baby Boy W., 988 P.2d 1270, 1271-72 (Okla.
1999) (explaining that, for several months, the father did not know he fathered a child)).
146 The dissent also listed numerous non-Indian cases demonstrating how common such
occurrences are in general. See id.
147 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 7 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
141
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from doing so when the mother went into hiding in order to place the baby
for adoption.148 Zachary H. was not an ICWA case.149 Nonetheless, the
court relied heavily on the reasoning in Bridget R., which was an ICWA
case,150 to deny the father's petition opposing his child's guardianship with
a potential adoptive couple.' 5' The Zachary H. court used Bridget R. to
support its conclusion that, when a child has no custodial relationship with
its biological parent, the noncustodial biological parent's interest in the
child cannot control.15 2 Thus, the court used an EIF case to hold that a
noncustodial father has no legal rights to his child even when his lack of
relationship with his child was due to the mother's deception.'
Second, in a similar case-In re Michael J. 154-the California Court of
Appeal found the ICWA inapplicable to a father who never learned of the
Indian mother's pregnancy. 55 Although the mother did not intentionally
conceal her pregnancy from her son's non-Indian father, she attributed her
pregnancy to another man and, thus, the biological father had no reason to
believe he was the father.' 56 Nevertheless, after finding out about the
child, the child's father attempted to establish a relationship with his son
and argued the ICWA entitled him reunification services.'
The ICWA makes no distinction between an Indian and non-Indian
parent with regard to the application of reunification services; therefore, a
non-Indian parent has a right equal to that of the Indian parent to invoke
the ICWA as the Indian parent.'5 8 Still, in MichaelJ, the state argued the
ICWA was inapplicable to the non-Indian father because he and his child

148 See id. at 10, 17.
149 See id. at 8-9.

15o See supra Part II.B.
1 ZacharyH., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 17.
152 id.

See id. at 9, 17 (explaining that the biological father asked the mother to reconsider
adoption, but she cut off all communication from him).
54
1 No. A103198, 2004 WL 551251 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2004).
153

'.sId.

116Id.

at *9, *13.

at *14.
Id. at *4_5.
158 Under the statutory definitions of the ICWA, a non-Indian parent of an Indian child
can use the ICWA. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(9) (2012) ('"[P]arent' means any biological parent or
parents of an Indian child . . . ."). In this case, however, the court did not decide the EIF
question because it determined that the father had waived the issue by not raising it below.
MichaelJ., 2004 WL 551251, at *7.
15

CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

346

[42:327

could not be considered an existing Indian family. "9 The court agreed.160
The court noted the "conceptual difficulties" of describing the father as a
parent under the ICWA because it determined that "[a]pplication of state
law to deny [father] reunification services did not damage an Indian
family. . . .,,16' The fact that the mother misled the father and, thus,
prevented the father from forming a relationship with the child made no
difference.162 The court still found the ICWA was inapplicable because the
court determined there was no Indian family to preserve.'6 3
Third, in In re Adoption of Baby Boy D,' the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma focused on the definition of "parent" under ICWA and indicated
that it could not apply the EIF doctrine despite a mother's concealment of
her pregnancy.165 Specifically, the Baby Boy D court determined that an
unwed father who had not legally established paternity had no rights under
the ICWA.166 Although the father knew of the pregnancy, the court's
reasoning was broad and made no exception for fathers unaware of a
pregnancy. 67
According to the Baby Boy D court, the ICWA does not apply to a
father who "made no attempt to acknowledge or establish paternity until he
filed his petition to vacate the decree of adoption." 68 Further, the court
added that limiting the ICWA's definition of a parent to fathers who have
acknowledged paternity:

159 Michael., 2004

16o

WL 551251, at *8.

Id. at *9.

161Id.

at *11.

Specifically, the court determined the failure to apply the ICWA was
harmless error because it found no existing Indian family. Id.
162See id. at *11-12 ("He also fails to demonstrate the
intended effect of the ICWA was
in any way compromised by the juvenile court's dispositional order. To the contrary, the
denial of reunification services under state law was premised on [the child's] best interests."
Id. at *12.).
Id. at *13.
'6 742 P.2d 1059 (Okla. 1985).
165Id. at 1064. See Richard B. Taylor, Note, Curbing the Erosion of the Rights of
Native Americans: Was the Supreme Court Successful in Mississippi Band of Choctaw
Indians v. Holyfield?, 29 J. FAM. L. 171, 178 (1990) ("If the mother conceals the fact that
the child is part Indian, and if the father does not know of the child ... , the court will not
acknowledge the child as being an 'Indian child' pursuant to the Act.").
166Baby Boy D, 742 P.2d
at 1064.
67
1

id.

18id.
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[I]s in accord with the stated purpose of the [A]ct[, which
is] to protect Indian children from the destruction of Indian
family units by child welfare agencies and courts. The
ICWA emphasizes that the Congress seeks to protect the
Indian child by setting minimum federal standards for the
removal of that Indian child from an existing Indian family
unit. Here we have a child who has never resided in an
Indian family, and who has a non-Indian mother. For the
foregoing reasons[,] we conclude [father] lacks standing to
invoke the ICWA in this case.169
Thus, the Baby Boy D court used the ELF doctrine to hold that, unless a
father acknowledges paternity-something particularly difficult for a
thwarted father to do-he has no right to invoke the ICWA. 70
The above EIF cases establish that the ICWA is unavailable to
thwarted fathers. However, Justice Breyer's exception for deceived fathers
Baby Girl's requirement of prior custody does
breaks with such cases.'

169
170

id.

Id. Increasingly, a deceived father who wishes to ensure acknowledgement of
paternity must register with a putative father registry. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 63-9-820(C) (Supp. 2013). Legislatures created these registries to allow fathers to retain
their rights even in the event that the mother wishes to hide her pregnancy. See id.
§ 63-9-810 (Supp. 2013). In states employing these registries, sexual intercourse is
considered notice of a potential child. See, e.g., id. § 63-9-820(L). Thus, a father who
wants to have legal rights to a resulting child must register with the putative father registry
based on nothing more than the fact that sexual intercourse can result in a child. However,
if a father fails to register, he loses his right to notification of a pending adoption, his
consent is not necessary for the adoption, and his ignorance of the pregnancy or adoption
does not give him grounds to contest a finalized adoption. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S.
248, 264 (1983) (upholding the constitutionality of these registries); see also S.C. CODE
ANN. § 63-9-820(D), (K); In re John Paul B., 909 N.Y.S.2d 753, 755 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010)
(finding father's consent unnecessary, even though mother concealed her pregnancy, where
he did not protect his paternal interest in the six months prior to the adoption).
171 See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2571 (2013) (Breyer, J.,
concurring); In re Adoption of a Child of Indian Heritage, 543 A.2d 925, 943 (N.J. 1988)
(finding the ICWA inapplicable because the father failed to establish paternity according to
state standards and the child had never lived in an Indian environment or Indian family).
Moreover, also relevant is that at least thirty states have putative father registries, including
some with the highest Indian populations, such as Oklahoma, Kansas, Arizona, New York,
and New Mexico. See State Putative Father Registries, N.H. REs. DIvIsION OFF. LEGIS.
SERVICES, http://www.courts.state.nh.us/probate/registrylist.pdf (last visited Feb 4, 2014).
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not apply to deceived fathers. 7 2 Baby Girl does not require these fathers to
acknowledge paternity, and it extends the ICWA's protections to thwarted
fathers regardless of whether the state considers such fathers to have a
legal relationship with their child. Consequently, this exception further
demonstrates that the Baby Girl decision is not an affirmation of the EIF
doctrine. 7 3
IV. SECTION 1915(A) AND THE CONTINUED RELEVANCY OF THE
ICWA's PLACEMENT PREFERENCES
In Baby Girl, the opinion's lack of reliance on the father's Indianness,
the fact it was limited to § 1912(d) and (f), and its exceptions for fathers
who have paid child support or been deceived 74 all support the proposition
that Baby Girl is not an affirmation of the EIF doctrine. However, the
Court's decision regarding the applicability of § 1915(a) is the most
definitive proof that Baby Girl does not affirm the EIF doctrine. The
majority held that the lower court incorrectly found § 1915(a) applicable to
this case, but the majority based its reasoning specifically on the father's
failure to file for adoption, not his lack of prior custody.s7 1
Section 1915(a) of the ICWA grants adoptive preference to "(1) a
member of the child's extended family; (2) other members of the Indian
child's tribe; or (3) other Indian families" in the "absence of good cause to
the contrary."' 76 The Supreme Court of South Carolina explained that,
even if it had terminated Dusten Brown's parental rights, the court still
would not have permitted the adoptive parents to adopt Veronica because
the ICWA placement preferences would have applied and the court would
have been obligated to place her with an interested party who fit one of
these preference categories. 177 Specifically, the court assumed § 1915(a)
Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. at 2571 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("[This case] does [not]
involve special circumstances such as a father who was deceived about the existence of a
the child....").
173 Although research for this Article found no published ICWA cases including
pregnancy concealment, numerous examples of such deception exist in family law cases in
general. See supra Part III.B.2. Moreover, in Baby Girl, the father knew about the
pregnancy, but the mother concealed her desire to place the child for adoption. See Baby
Girl, 133 S. Ct. at 2558.
174 See supra Part III.
171 See Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. at 2564.
176 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (2012).
177 See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d 550, 566-67 (S.C.
2012), rev'd, 133
S. Ct. 2552 (2013).
172
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meant that, even if the court terminated Brown's parental rights, the court
would still have had to consider him or his parents as potential adoptive
placements and, absent good cause, give the Browns preference over the

adoptive parents.178
A. Baby Girl Does Not Require Continued Custodyfor § 1915(a)
The Supreme Court rejected the South Carolina courts' understanding
of § 1915(a)."' 9 However, once again, its reasoning was not based on the
EIF doctrine. According to the Court, the placement preferences of
§ 1915(a) are inapplicable in cases in which "no alternative party that is
eligible to be preferred under § 1915(a) has come forward."so The Court
explained that the placement preferences were not available because the
adoptive parents were the only party that sought to adopt Veronica."' The
Court held that § 1915(a) did not cover Brown at the time of initial hearing
"because he did not seek to adopt Baby Girl."' 8 2 Further, the Court added
that the same reasoning applied to the paternal grandparents because they
also "never sought custody of Baby Girl."1 8 3 Importantly, at no point did
the Court state that § 1915(a) was inapplicable because Brown had no prior
custodial relationship with Veronica. In fact, the Court's discussion
implies the opposite conclusion; regardless of a prior custodial
relationship, § 1915(a) applies to any Indian party formally filing for
adoption or custody. 18 4
The Court's opinion makes clear that, had the father, the grandparents,
or another member of the tribe attempted to adopt Veronica at the initial
hearing, the placement preferences of § 1915(a) would have been
applicable regardless of the fact that they had no prior relationship with her
and, therefore, could not be considered an "existing Indian family.""' This
part of the Court's opinion is odd because it means that noncustodial
Indian parents facing termination will likely fare better in their bids to
17s See id. at 566.

" See Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. at 2564-65.
"' Id. at 2564.
181

id.

182

Id. (emphasis omitted).

183 Id.

See id.at 2564 ("In this case, Adoptive Couple was the only party that sought to
adopt Baby Girl in Family Court or the South Carolina Supreme Court. Biological Father is
not covered by § 1515(a) because he did not seek to adopt Baby Girl...." (citation
omitted)).
I"s See id. at 2564-65.
184
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adopt their own children than in their attempts to prevent the termination of
their parental rights. However, regardless of its peculiarity, this part of the
decision was clearly not an adoption of the EIF doctrine.
Similarly, Justice Breyer's concurrence supports this understanding of
the applicability of § 1915(a) to noncustodial fathers. In his concurrence,
Justice Breyer specifically notes that, even after termination, the provisions
of § 1915(a) could still "allow an absentee father to reenter the special
statutory order of preference. ,,186 Justice Sotomayor makes this point even
more explicitly in her dissent, noting:
[T]he majority does not and cannot foreclose the
possibility that on remand, Baby Girl's paternal
grandparents or other members of the Cherokee Nation
may formally petition for adoption of Baby Girl. If these
parties do so, and if on remand Birth Father's parental
rights are terminated so that an adoption becomes possible,
they will then be entitled to consideration under the order
of preference established in § 1915. The majority cannot
rule prospectively that § 1915 would not apply to an
adoption petition that has not yet been filed. Indeed the
statute applies "[i]n any adoptive placement of an Indian
child under [s]tate law" and contains no temporal
qualifications.18 7
B. The South CarolinaSupreme Court Was Wrong
As this Article has demonstrated, three separate opinions-the
majority, Justice Breyer's concurrence, and the dissent-all support the
understanding that an Indian parent's prior custodial relationship with the
parent's child has no bearing on the applicability of the ICWA's placement
preferences.188 Consequently, Baby Girl stands in stark contrast to EIF
cases such as In re Santos Y., which explicitly held that the placement
preferences of § 1915(a) do not apply when there is no existing Indian
family to preserve. 18 9 However, although the Baby Girl decision holds that
the placement provisions can still apply regardless of a father's prior

186 Id. at 2571 (Breyer, J., concurring).

Id. at 2585 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (first alteration in original) (quoting 25 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a) (2012)).
187

188 See supra Part I.A.
1

In re Santos Y., 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 692, 726 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
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custodial relationship,' 90 on remand the South Carolina Supreme Court
misinterpreted the Court's decision and held the placement preferences
inapplicable to Veronica's adoption.' 9'
After the Supreme Court's decision, Dusten Brown and his parents
filed petitions to adopt Veronica.192 The Court's decision made clear that
such a filing was necessary for a court to consider Brown or his parents
under the ICWA's placement preferences.19 3 However, the South Carolina
Supreme Court ignored these adoption petitions and issued an order
treating the Baby Girl decision as if it was in existence at the time of the
original adoption hearing.194 Then, after making this temporal contortion,
the court determined § 1915(a) was inapplicable to Veronica's adoption
because the adoptive parents were still the only ones that had filed a

petition.195
The South Carolina court's decision was disingenuous and wrong. The
Browns had filed for adoption and, thus, according to Baby Girl,they were
entitled to the protections of § 1915(a).19 6 Nevertheless, although this
ruling was wrong with regard to the Browns, the Baby Girl decision does
support similar rulings in subsequent ICWA cases. In the future, many
potential Indian adoptive parents will not have filed a competing adoption
petition at the time a court considers a non-Indian adoption.
The Baby Girl case was an unusually high-profile ICWA case,197 thus
providing the Browns with the notice, opportunity, and legal support
o90
See Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. at 2564.
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 746 S.E.2d 51, 52 (S.C. 2013) (denying the birth
father's argument that the ICWA prohibited the adoption of Baby Veronica).
192 Knapp, supra note 1, at Al. See Baby Girl, 746 S.E.2d at 52 (explaining
that the
191

birth father raised the issue of whether this case should have been moved to Oklahoma,
which was where the competing adoption petitions were pending).
"9 Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. at 2564.
114 Baby Girl, 746 S.E.2d at 53.
195 Id.
196 The issue on remand should have been solely whether there was good cause to
deviate from these placement preferences. See BIA Guidelines for State Courts, 44 Fed.
Reg. 67,584, 67,594 (Nov. 26, 1979); see also In re A.H., No. SCUK-JVSQ-l 1-16333-01,
2012 WL 6178300, at *7 n.8 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 12, 2012) ("The party opposing the
placement has the burden to show there is good cause not to follow the stated
preferences."); People ex rel. A.R., 310 P.3d 1007, 1018 (Colo. App. 2012) (stating that the
party seeking to overcome the presumption that the ICWA preferences apply must show
good cause).
197 See Nicole Adams, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl: Information and Resources,
NAT'L INDIAN CHILD WELFARE Ass'N, http://www.nicwa.org/babyveronical (last visited
(continued)
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needed to file for adoption and seek the protections of § 1915(a). The
South Carolina Family Court should have granted the Browns' adoption
petitions, but did not consider the petitions only because the South
Carolina Supreme Court misinterpreted the Baby Girl decision. However,
few future Indian fathers and grandparents will have similar resources.
Therefore, although the Baby Girl decision primarily concerns § 1912, the
Court's discussion of § 1915(a) might have the most wide-reaching impact.

V. BABY GIL AND THE ICWA PLACEMENT PREFERENCES
The Baby Girl case focuses on the applicability of § 1912(d) and (f) to
a noncustodial father in a voluntary adoption proceeding.19 8 However,
voluntary private adoptions make up only 2% of the entire ICWA
caseload.199 The majority of ICWA adoption and custody cases concern a
child involuntarily removed from the parents' custody. 200 The Court's
decision about § 1912(d) and (f) has little relevance for these Indian
families, but its discussion of § 1915(a) is extremely pertinent. In
Mississippi Band of Choctaw v. Holyfield,201 the Supreme Court's only
other ICWA case,202 the Court described § 1915(a) as "[t]he most
important substantive requirement [the ICWA] imposed on state courts." 203
Consequently, any change in the applicability of § 1915(a) is hugely
important.

Feb. 5, 2014) ("Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl garnered significant concern from Indian
Country, as the decision had great potential to impact not just the future of [the] ICWA, but
also Congress'[s] power to pass laws that protect Indian tribes and people.").
198See supraPart III.A.

199 Amendments to the Indian Child Welfare Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Indian Affairs, 104th Cong. 107 (1996) (statement of Deborah J. Doxtator, Chairwoman,
Oneida Tribe of Indians of Wisconsin).
200 See id at 107-08 ("The vast majority of children presently on our caseload have
been placed in foster care because their parents are unable to care for them at the present
time.").
201 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
202 See Abigail Perkiss, Supreme Court's Upcoming Child-Custody Decision: The Baby
Veronica Case, YAHOO! NEWS (Mar. 4, 2013, 11:00 AM), http://news.yahoo.com/supreme(stating
court-upcoming-child-custody-decision-baby-veronica-il 0206332--politics.html
that the the Supreme Court first considered the ICWA in Holyfield and it would come
before the Court again in Adoptive Couple).
203 Holyfield, 490 U.S.
at 36.
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A. The PriorUnderstandingof § 1915(a)
Until the Baby Girl decision, § 1915(a) appeared to place an
affirmative duty on states to seek out and prefer Indian custodians to nonIndian custodians in all Indian child adoption and custody cases.2 04 The
commentary to the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) Guideline F. 1 reflects
this view, stating that § 1915(a) requires "that the court or agent make an
active effort to find out if there are families entitled to preference who
would be willing to adopt the child." 20 5 As a result, states understood
§ 1915(a) to mean that, whenever they consider the placement of an Indian
child, they must ask the Indian parent about potential family placements,
contact those family members, contact the tribe, or seek placement with a
native foster family. 20 6 For example, § 361.31(g) of California's Welfare
and Institutional Code reflects this view of state obligations, stating: "Any
person or court involved in the placement of an Indian child shall use the
services of the Indian child's tribe, whenever available through the tribe, in
seeking to secure placement within the order of placement preference
established in this section and in the supervision of the placement." 2 0 7
The belief that § 1915(a) imposes an affirmative duty on states to seek
Indian placements has meant that Indian parents and tribes have been able
to offer a forceful challenge to the nonnative placement of their children,
so long as they can demonstrate someone in the preference categories was
204

See 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (2012).

BIA Guidelines for State Courts, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584, 67,594 (Nov. 26, 1979).
See Adina B. v. State Dep't of Health & Soc. Serys., No. S-14314, 2012 WL
516007, at *4-5 (Alaska Feb. 15, 2012) (explaining that the Office of Children's Services
contacted the maternal grandmother and also specifically sought an "Alaska Native medical
foster home" before placing the child with a non-native foster mother).
207 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.31(g) (2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-109 (2013)
("If a proceeding under this chapter involves an Indian child, as defined in the Indian Child
Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. 1901, et seq., the proceeding is subject to the Indian Child Welfare
Act."); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 40.6 (2009) ("In all placements of an Indian child ... , the
person or placement agency shall utilize to the maximum extent possible the services of the
Indian tribe of the child in securing placement consistent with the provisions of the
Oklahoma Indian Child Welfare Act."); OR. REv. STAT. § 419B.500 (2007) ("If an Indian
child is involved, the termination of parental rights must be in compliance with the Indian
Child Welfare Act."); S.D. CODIFIED LAWs § 26-8A-32 (2004) ("Due regard shall be
afforded to the Indian Child Welfare Act ... if that Act is applicable."); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
33, § 5120 (Supp. 2013) ("The federal Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.,
governs any proceeding under this title that pertains to an Indian child, as defined by
the Indian Child Welfare Act, and prevails over any inconsistent provision of this title.").
205

206
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208

Moreover, although courts have ruled that
interested in taking custody.
there was good cause for the non-Indian placement in many cases, 2 09 Courts
had not rejected, until Baby Girl, § 1915(a) challenges because the
potential custodians had not formally initiated adoption procedures.
For example, in PitRiver Tribe v. Superior Court, the California Court
of Appeal reversed the lower court's approval of a non-Indian placement
for an Indian child because it did not comport with § 1915(a).210 In this
case, the tribe brought an action to vacate the lower court's order because it
deviated from the ICWA placement preferences, and the appellate court
granted the motion.2 ' In explaining its decision, the court noted that,
although the tribe identified multiple potential relative placements, the
Sacramento County Department of Children and Family Services made
few efforts to evaluate these relatives or actively assist in their custodial
bids.212 As a result, the court found that the department failed to make
active efforts to comply with the ICWA preference categories.213
Specifically, the Pit River court held that the department violated the
ICWA because it failed to do the following: use the services of the tribe to
secure placement in conformity with the ICWA; evaluate in a timely
fashion the relatives recommended by the tribe; assist in obtaining a
criminal records exception for these relatives or explain why it did not do
so; and apply the tribe's social and cultural standards when evaluating the
relative placement.214 Thus, the court interpreted the ICWA as requiring
active efforts on the part of the state to locate potential Indian caregivers.215
However, the court did not require the potential Indian caregivers to
identify themselves first, and it certainly did not require them to formally
file for adoption.216

See Pit River Tribe v. Superior Court, No. C067900, 2011 WL 4062512, at *1 (Cal.
Ct. App. Sept. 14, 2011) (vacating lower court's placement order because it deviated from
the ICWA placement preferences).
209 See, e.g., In re B.B.A., 224 P.3d 1285, 1286 (Okla. Civ. App. 2009) (finding the
biological parents' preference of a non-Indian placement constituted good cause).
210
Pit River Tribe, 2011 WL 4062512, at *1.
211 Id.
208

212

Id. at *9, *11.

213 Id.
214

at *9.

Id. at *12.

See id. at *9.
See id. at *12 (holding that the department violated the ICWA based on its own
failures not to confer with the tribe before placement, refusal to review initially the tribe's
(continued)
215

216

PLACEMENT PREFERENCES IN JEOPARDY

2014]

355

Similarly, People ex rel. South Dakota Department of Social
Services217 also demonstrates how courts have interpreted § 1915(a) to
require active efforts to locate potential Indian caregivers. In this case, the
Supreme Court of South Dakota affirmed the lower court's finding of good
cause to deviate from the placement preferences only after it determined
that the South Dakota Department of Social Services had "conducted a
diligent search and no suitable ICWA-preferred placement options had
been found." 2 18 In more detail, the court quoted the circuit court's
findings:
Since the inception of this case in August of 2006, over
[3.5] years ago, the South Dakota Department of Social
Services has conducted diligent searches for an adoptive
placement within the preferences set forth in [the
ICWA]... . [DSS] has made contact with the minor
child's tribe and has contacted known members of the
child's extended family, as defined by [the ICWA], but has
been unable to locate a suitable placement for the children
within the preference guidelines.... The Court finds that
placement of the child within the order of preference as set
forth in [the ICWA] is not available and that good cause
exists for placement of the child with an individual or
family outside of said order of preference .... 2 1 9

placement recommendation, failure to consider the tribe's cultural standards, and failure to
acquire criminal records).
217 795 N.W.2d 39 (S.D. 2011).
21 8

Id. at 44.

Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). For example, in an
Arizona appellate court decision, a native mother challenged her children's placement in a
nonnative foster home. Yvonne L. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 258 P.3d 233, 237 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2011). The mother argued that the children should have been placed with her half
sister, whom the tribe established was interested. Id. at 237, 242. However, closer
examination revealed that the sister was uncertain about her willingness to be a guardian,
did not want to permanently adopt the children and, thus, did not have the backing of the
tribe. Id. at 242. Accordingly, the court found good cause to deviate from the placement
preferences. Id.; see also Christina H. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., No. 1 CA-JV11-0145,
2012 WL 70650, at *7 (Ariz. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2012) (finding that good cause existed to
place the child near her relatives on the reservation rather than placing the child with her
grandmother).
219
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Baby Girl appears to have eliminated the active efforts requirement of

§ 1915(a). States are no longer required to seek out potential adoptive
Indian caregivers. 22 0 Instead, the potential caregivers now bear the onus to
identify themselves and take the necessary steps to file for adoption, and
this change will likely drastically reduce the probability of Indian adoptees
being placed in Indian homes. The one glimmer of hope is that § 1915(b)
could potentially mitigate this effect if future courts find Baby Girl had no
impact on this provision. At the same time, an opposite ruling (i.e., that
Baby Girldoes impact § 1915(b)) could gut the ICWA.
B. Section 1915(b) After Baby Girl
Prior to Baby Girl, states clearly had to use active efforts to find Indian
adoptive homes.22' In addition, it was well established that states had to
use active efforts to locate Indian foster homes,222 as § 1915(b) covers the
foster care placements of Indian children and states that Indian children in
foster care are to be placed in the same order of preference listed in
§ 1915(a).223 Although the adoption in Baby Girl was voluntary, this
provision is essential because the majority of Indian adoptions are
involuntary and begin as foster care cases.224 Consequently, the question
of Baby Girl's impact on § 1915(b) is crucial.
Before the Baby Girl decision, the ICWA's placement preferences also
clearly applied to foster cases; 225 additionally, Baby Girl did not
specifically address § 1915(b). 2 26 Thus, the Court's decision may be
limited to § 1915(a). If this turns out to be true, then the continued
applicability of the placement preferences in the foster care context would
leave the likelihood of an Indian child's eventual adoption by an Indian
family relatively unchanged. The majority of Indian child adoptions occur
after the child has been involuntarily removed from their parent's care and,
See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2564 (2013) (finding § 1915(a)
because Adoptive Father did not seek to adopt Baby Girl).
inapplicable
221
See supra Part V.A.
220

222See supra Part V.A.

223 25 U.S.C.

§ 1915(b) (2012).

224 Amendments

to the Indian Child Welfare Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Indian Affairs, supra note 199, at 107-08.
225 See supra Part V.A. "In anyfoster care or preadoptive placement, a preference shall
be given" to placements conforming to requirements very similar to those listed in
§ 1915(a). 25 U.S.C. § 1915(b) (emphasis added).
226 See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2557-58 (2013) (stating that the
relevant provisions of the ICWA to this case were §§ 1912(d), (f), and 1915(a)).
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thus, most fall under § 1915(b). 227 However, because Baby Girl virtually
eliminated the applicability of placement preferences for voluntary Indian
adoptions, courts may interpret the decision to have done the same for
foster care adoptions.
After the Baby Girl decision, there is a real possibility that future
courts will hold that § 1915(b) must be treated like § 1915(a) and find that
the placement preferences of § 1915(b) only apply after a potential Indian
caregiver has actually applied to become a foster parent. Under this
interpretation of Baby Girl, the state would be under no duty to locate and
actively encourage potential Indian caregivers.228 In fact, the Court's
decision might actually mean that a state could intentionally discourage
potential Indian caregivers from seeking to become foster parents because
any requirement of active efforts to comply with the placement preferences
would not attach until after the caregiver's formal request to become a
foster parent to that child. Then, after the state placed the Indian child with
a non-Indian caregiver, the child's adoption by that non-Indian caregiver
would also be exempt from the ICWA's placement preferences unless a
potential Indian caregiver had filed formal adoption papers.
C. Section 1915(e) andIts Relation to § 1915(a)
Interpreting § 1915(b) similar to § 1915(a) could have devastating
consequences for Indian families. However, there is a strong argument
against interpreting either of these provisions as limited to those who have
made formal custody requests because doing so creates a significant
statutory interpretation problem. Section 1915(e) states: "A record of each
such placement, under [s]tate law, of an Indian child shall be maintained
by the [s]tate in which the placement was made, evidencing the efforts to
comply with the order of preference specified in this section." 229 When
interpreting this provision, lower courts-like the Utah appellate court in
State ex rel. C.D.230 -have determined that § 1915(e) must be read in

See Amendments to the Indian Child Welfare Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
IndianAffairs, supra note 199, at 107-08.
228 Federal foster care law requires that states give notice to relatives
when a child has
been removed, but there is no requirement of active efforts beyond this. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 671 (a)(29). Additionally, there is no requirement to make "reasonable efforts"-the term
used in federal foster care law-to facilitate a kinship placement. See id. Moreover, there
is no preference for Indian relatives. See id.
229 25 U.S.C. § 1915(e).
230 200 P.3d 194 (Utah Ct. App.
2008).
227
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tandem with the placement preferences of § 1915(a). 231 According to the
CD. court, "the ICWA expressly requires that a record be created that
documents the attempts to place the children in compliance with the ICWA
preferences."23 2 Such an explanation makes sense if states must make
active efforts to locate potential Indian caregivers. However, if the
placement preferences of § 1915(a) or (b) are now limited to persons who
have formally filed for custody, the provision becomes nonsensical.
Baby Girl appears to permit ignoring interested, potential Indian
custodians in any instance in which they have not formally filed for
custody.233 However, this means the requirement of § 1915(e), which
requires that states document their efforts to comply with the placement
preferences, is toothless if states are only required to document their efforts
to place children with Indian caregivers who have already formally filed
Such an interpretation of the placement preference
for custody.
requirements would clearly contradict the Court's statement in Mississippi
Band of Choctaw v. Holyfield that § 1915(a) is the ICWA's most important
provision.234
D. The Future ofPlacement Preferences
Most concerning in the Court's discussion of § 1915(a) is that the
Court seems to have given little thought to the implications of this part of
its decision. The majority focuses on § 1912(d) and (f). 2 35 The discussion
of § 1915(a) appears almost as an aside, yet it is the section with
potentially the greatest impact. The Court's decision regarding § 1915(a)
appears to disrupt long-established ICWA policy and procedure. Now,
tribes must be extra vigilant in identifying potential Indian custodians and
encouraging them to formally seek custody because of this ruling. In all
likelihood, this means tribes will need to increase the assistance they offer
potential Indian custodians-specifically help in complying with
procedural requirements, filings, and deadlines-if they hope to ensure the
ICWA's placement preferences remain meaningful.
Moreover, although increased tribal efforts may prove successful in
some instances, the realities of many tribes' finances and organization
mean that the declining importance of § 1915(a) is all but assured. ICWA
231 See id. at 208.
232

Id. at 212 n.31.
See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2564 (2013) ("Biological Father
is not covered by § 1915(a) because he did not seek to adopt Baby Girl .....
233

234

490 U.S. 30, 36 (1989).

235

See Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. at 2559-62, 2563-65.
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cases are replete with instances of tribes and Indian family members
needing additional time and assistance to successfully challenge
placements.2 36 As a result, notice will be key now more than ever.
Without adequate notice, there is little hope that tribes will be able to
identify potential placements and have potential adoptive parents file
adoption petitions within the allotted time frame. However, increased
reliance on notice is also concerning given the fact that notice deficiencies
are common in ICWA cases.237
The ICWA requires that tribes receive notice of the potential adoption
of an Indian child, 2 38 yet errors are common-even the Baby Girl case
included such an error. Although the state sent Cherokee Nation notice
that Veronica might be an Indian child, the notice the tribe received had
Dusten Brown's first name misspelled and included his incorrect
birthdate. 23 9 Given this faulty information, the tribe was unable to confirm
whether Veronica was an Indian child eligible for enrollment.240
Therefore, if Brown had not independently challenged the termination of
his parental rights,24' the tribe might never have learned of Veronica's
adoption, and it certainly would not have had the time to identify potential
placements before the adoption was finalized. Thus, the Baby Girl
decision now makes adequate tribal notice more crucial than ever. The
only way the ICWA's preference provisions will continue to protect Indian
tribes and their children is through notice and speedy action on the part of
the tribe.
See, e.g., In re Adam L., No. F062458, 2012 WL 274741, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan.
31, 2012) ("The tribe ... failed to file its transfer request promptly after reunification
efforts failed."); In re Alvarez, Nos. 304669, 304670, 2012 WL 2476421, at *2 (Mich. Ct.
App. June 28, 2012) (noting that the tribe did not respond to the first notice of termination
hearing but did respond to the second).
237 See, e.g., In re A.M., No. A129891, 2012 WL 661787, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 28,
2012) ("[The Contra Costa County Bureau of Children and Family Services] acknowledged
that it had failed to make any inquiry about Mother's Indian heritage or notify the [t]ribe of
the proceedings."); In re D.W., 193 Cal. App. 4th 413, 417 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (noting
numerous deficiencies with tribal notice); Nicole K. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 251,
254-55 (Cal Ct. App. 2007) (remanding to provide a proper ICWA notice after human
services agency sent the ICWA notice to the wrong address for the tribe and there was no
evidence that the tribe received actual notice of the proceedings).
238 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (2012).
239 Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. at 2558.
240 id
241 Id. at 2558-59.
236
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Baby Girl case cast the ICWA into the national spotlight and led
many to question its necessity. However, it is clear the Court's decision
was not a referendum on the ICWA. The Court had the opportunity to
adopt the EIF doctrine and create significant exceptions to the ICWA's
applicability, but it declined to do so. 24 2 Instead, the Court issued a narrow
ruling reaffirming the viability of the ICWA. 243 Additionally, although the
decision has the potential to significantly limit the applicability of Indian
placement preferences, there is the possibility that vigilant efforts on the
part of tribes and their advocates will prevent this from occurring.

242

See supra Part III.
III.

243 See supra Part

